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SECTION 101 4 (B)(6) AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Jeremy T. Ware*
One of the most widely used tax loopholes in the Internal Revenue Code is
the § 1014 step up in basis provision. This provision typically allows taxpayers
receiving property from a decedent to increase the basis of such property to the
fair market value at the time of death.1 The residents of the community prop-
erty states are further entitled to a "full step up" via § 1014(b)(6), which allows
a basis step up not only for the decedent's half of community property, but also
for the surviving spouse's half of the same community property. This step up
is, perhaps, the primary federal tax advantage of community property.
In light of these tax advantages, it is important to understand the bounda-
ries of community property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). Community property
law has many contours and confusions that cloud the picture of how certain
property will be treated by the IRS. This article seeks to explore eight major
areas of possible confusion to determine how the Service and the courts might
treat such property under the full step up in basis provision. These areas are:
(1) Commingling of separate and community property; (2) Agreements to live
in universal community; (3) Adoption by a common law state of the Uniform
Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act; (4) Changes in mari-
tal domicile from a community property state to a common law state; (5) Com-
munity property with right of survivorship; (6) The Alaska Community
Property Act's elective regime as it pertains to Alaska residents; (7) Commu-
nity property trusts created by community property state residents; and (8)
Alaska community property trusts created by nonresidents. Though the Service
has not spoken clearly on all of these points, this article seeks to sharpen the
boundary lines of what is or should be community property for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6).
INTRODUCTION TO § 1014
As briefly noted above, section 1014 serves as one of the largest tax loop-
holes in the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). Subsection 1014(a) provides
that, generally, "the basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the
property from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent shall
... be ... the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
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death .... , Thus, the appreciation on most property passing from decedents
entirely escapes federal income taxation. This is obviously a major benefit in a
world where, it is often said, the only sure things are death and taxes.3
Residents in community property states enjoy a further advantage, known
generally as the "full step up." Usually, when spouses own a piece of property
jointly and one of them dies, only the decedent's half of the property would be
stepped up.4 But § 1014(b)(6) provides that, for purposes of § 1014(a), prop-
erty acquired or passing from the decedent includes,
property which represents the surviving spouse's one-half share of community prop-
erty held by the decedent and the surviving spouse under the community property
laws of any State, or possession of the United States or any foreign country, if at least
one-half of the whole of the community interest in such property was includible in
determining the value of the decedent's gross estate.
5
In other words, the basis of the whole of such community property will be
stepped up, not just the decedent's half.6 Thus, residents in community prop-
erty states enjoy not only the advantage of the § 1014 step up, but also a double
application of the step up, assuming § 1014(b)(6) is satisfied.7
To understand why Congress would treat community property state
residents so favorably, one must briefly explore the history of marital property
in the United States. The purpose behind § 1014(b)(6) illuminates a discussion
of what property may qualify for this provision, and what the future of the
provision will or should be.
Section 1014(b)(6) applies to all decedents dying after December 31,
1947. In the late 1940s, most marital property was earned by the husband.
Thus, in a common law state, nearly all of a couple's property may have legally
been the separate property of the husband. If the husband dies first, which is
probable, nearly all of the couple's property would receive a basis step up.8 In
a community property state, however, the husband's earnings are community
property. 9 Therefore, at death, he could probably bequeath only half of the
marital property, and so only half of the couple's property would receive the
step up. An inequality thus existed between common law and community
property states.
Section 1014(b)(6) was intended to remedy this inequality. In the words
of the Ninth Circuit in Willging v. United States, "Section 1014(b)(6) was
designed to equalize the incidence of taxation between community-property
and common-law states."1 Importantly, for our purposes, the court goes on to
add that § 1014(b)(6) was not designed, "to provide a special benefit to com-
2 Id.
3 Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), reprinted in THE
OxFoRD DIcrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (5th Ed. 1999).
4 I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2001).
5 Id. § 1014(b)(6).
6 Id.
7 Id.
I I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1), (b)(1).
9 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004).
10 Willging v. United States, 474 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord Bath v. United States,
323 F.2d 980, 981 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting Bath v. United States, 211 F.Supp. 368, 370
(S.D. Tex. 1962)). See also S.REP. No. 80-1013, at 29 (1948).
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munity-property taxpayers."'" Clearly, section 1014(b)(6) today acts primarily
as a tax advantage for those in community property states, because property is
not always so concentrated in the husband's hands as when § 1014(b)(6) first
became effective. The current reaction to this fact will be discussed later.12
An individual can access the modem-day tax advantages of the full step up
if property is considered community property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). To
understand what property will be considered community property in the context
of 1014(b)(6) one must first see how federal taxes are imposed.
In summarizing the procedure of tax imposition, the United States Tax
Court held that:
It has been established that what constitutes an interest in property held by a person
within a State is a matter of State law ... In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch....
the Supreme Court held that State law as announced by the highest court of the State
is to be followed. "If there is no decision by that court, then federal authorities must
apply what they find to be the state law..." On the other hand, once property rights
are determined under State law, Federal law is utilized to decide the tax
consequences. 13
This fits especially well with § 1014(b)(6), which only requires that property be
considered community property "under the community property laws of any
State." Thus, under the plain language of the statute, if property is community
property under the relevant state's law, then presumably § 1014(b)(6) should
provide a full step up for such property.' 4 Such language suggests a straight-
forward statutory inquiry into whether § 1014(b)(6) applies, but in reality its
application has been much more complex.
A. Commingling of Separate and Community Property
Under most state laws, commingling of separate and community property
typically transmutes the separate property into community property.1 5 But will
this taxpayer-created community property be treated as such for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6)? The IRS has not spoken clearly, but it would seem that this type
of community property does qualify for the full step up.
For example, commingling occurs when a spouse deposits her community
property paychecks into a regularly used checking account that also contains
her own separate property.1 6 Such separate property may derive from an inher-
itance, property acquired before marriage, or any number of other sources.17
Over the course of time, the community and separate property become so inter-
mixed that it is impossible to distinguish what is separate or community.
Though the effect of commingling varies by state, this Louisiana defini-
tion is typical: "commingling of separate and community property in a bank
1 Willging, 474 F.2d at 14.
12 See Conclusion infra.
13 Estate of Young v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 297, 300 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (quot-
ing Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1987)).
14 But see Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964) (rare case where federal law pre-empts
state law involving federal bonds).
'" See, e.g., Stoutz v. United States, 324 F.Supp. 197, 203 (E.D. La. 1970) (internal cita-
tions omitted), aff'd, 439 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1971).
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 770.
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account destroys the identity of the separate funds .... The separate character
of money commingled with community funds remains intact only if the amount
of community funds commingled constitutes an insignificant percentage of the
total fund."' 8 Some states further require that the community funds be indistin-
guishable from the separate funds for commingling to occur.' 9 But putting
aside specific state requirements, because commingling undoubtedly and
explicitly creates community property in some states,2° the question arises
whether the IRS will recognize the changed character of this property for pur-
poses of § 1014(b)(6). The IRS has not taken a discoverable position on the
matter, but a number of factors suggest that the Service will accept, perhaps
begrudgingly, such transmutations for § 1014(b)(6) purposes.
First, the courts seem to presume the validity of commingling transmuta-
tions for other federal tax purposes. 21 For example, in Sweeney v. Commis-
sioner the predecessor of the Tax Court encountered a classic commingling
situation concerning a Washington couple.22 The IRS argued that various
properties of a deceased husband were his separate property, and were therefore
taxable at 100% of their value for federal estate tax purposes.2 3 The surviving
wife argued that the property had been commingled in a common account (as
well as transmuted by agreement) and had thus become community property,
consequently exposing only 50% of the property to the estate tax. 24 The court
wrote,
[W]here separate and community property have become so intermingled, commin-
gled and merged as to make segregation difficult or impossible, the whole is treated
as community property ... In consideration both of the commingling of the property
and of the express agreement between the parties, we hold that the entire property
formerly owned by the decedent and [the wife of the decedent] ... was community
property.
25
The estate tax was subsequently assessed on approximately half tle value
the IRS had argued for.26 The Tax Court came to a similar conclusion regard-
ing the federal gift tax in Damner v. Commissioner.27 So for purposes of the
federal estate and gift taxes, commingling seems to be an effective means of
transmutation of separate property into community property. While there are
no cases specifically addressing the effectiveness of commingling transmuta-
tions for § 1014(b)(6) purposes, the cases above suggest that the courts would
find commingling to be an effective means of transmutation for purposes of this
section of the federal Internal Revenue Code as well.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Sweeney v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 1287, 1292-93 (1929).
20 See, e.g., Stoutz, 324 F.Supp. at 203; Sweeney, 15 B.T.A. at 1292-93 (Washington);
Houska v. Houska, 512 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Idaho 1973); Damner v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 638, 642
(1944) (California).
21 Sweeney, 15 B.T.A. at 1287.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1287-93.
25 Id. at 1292-93 (internal citations omitted).
26 Id. at 1293.
27 Damner v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 638, 642 (1944) (California).
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Second, commingling transmutations seem to fit within the plain meaning
of the statute. Section 1014(b)(6) only requires that property be considered
community property "under the community property laws of any State...""
Commingling clearly transmutes the character of separate property to commu-
nity property in certain states.29 A plain meaning application of § 1014(b)(6)
seems to suggest that commingling would be an effective transmutation under
the statute as long as the property were considered transmuted under state law.
Thus, the full step up should occur.
Indeed, the IRS seems to adhere strongly to the plain meaning of
§ 1014(b)(6). In Revenue Ruling 87-98, the Service addressed a situation in
which a couple domiciled in a community property state took title to real prop-
erty as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, a common law form of separate
property ownership. 30 This raised a presumption of transmutation from com-
munity to separate property, under state law.3 But the IRS noted that because
the couple had indicated in their wills that they considered the property to be
community property, the presumption was overcome under state law. 32 Even
though the title to the property indicated separate ownership, the IRS held that
"[b]ecause it is community property under state law, it is also community prop-
erty within the meaning of section 1014(b)(6). ' 33 So even in a case where the
IRS could argue that the property was separate property according to the real
property titling, it adhered strictly to the state law characterization of the prop-
erty as community and allowed the full step up. Likewise, it would seem that
where state law found commingled separate property to be transmuted to com-
munityproperty, the IRS might very well allow the application of § 1014(b)(6)
to such property.
Third, commingling is regularly recommended by estate planners as a
means of transmuting separate property into community property for purposes
of § 1014(b)(6). 34 "Section 1014 provides an advantage to community prop-
erty interests not available to any other type of marital property ... For citi-
zens living in community property states, the conversion of highly appreciated
separate property can be achieved by commingling of funds, ' ' 35 thus tapping
into the full step up advantage. This commingling process is simply assumed
to be a viable method of transmutation.36
Fourth, it is almost certain that couples are commingling separate property
every day and later claiming the full step up for all of the transmuted property,
28 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
29 See, e.g., Stoutz v. United States, 324 F.Supp. 197, 203 (E.D. La. 1970) (Louisiana);
Sweeney, 15 B.T.A. at 1292-93 (Washington); Houska v. Houska, 512 P.2d 1317, 1319
(Idaho 1973) (Idaho); Damner, 3 T.C. at 642 (California).
30 1987-2 C.B. 206.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g.,Edward F. Koren, Taso M. Milonas & William B. Roberts, Types of Property
Ownership, Community Property - Basis Adjustment, in EDWARD F. KOREN, ESTATE AND
PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING § 10:52 (2003); Gary C. Randall, Estate Planning and
Community Property, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 807, 815 (1991/1992).
3' Koren, supra note 34, at § 10:52.
36 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 815.
[Vol. 5:704
Spring 2005] SECTION 1014(B)(6) AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 709
whether or not they commingled for the sole purpose of claiming the full step
up. The practice must be widespread, and yet the Service has not addressed it.
The IRS's silence suggests acquiescence, at least for the present, though
this is by no means certain. The case law, though tangential, seems to suggest
that commingling would be an effective transmutation for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6). The plain meaning of the statute also seems to favor allowance
of the practice. And the ubiquitous use of commingling would presumably
invoke a response by the IRS if it did not agree with the practice.
A number of reasons for acquiescence suggest themselves. Perhaps the
IRS feels that the cost of enforcement concerning such a widespread practice is
prohibitive. Perhaps the potential tax revenue is simply not large enough to
justify the additional expenditures for enforcement. The IRS may not wish to
be viewed as attacking the longstanding practice of giving unpropertied spouses
a community share in transmuted property. It may believe that such transmuta-
tion could be easily achieved in other ways or that the courts would rule against
it based on the extant case law.3 7 Or it may simply be that the IRS believes that
§ 1014(b)(6) should apply to such transmutations, based on the plain meaning
of the statute.
The Service does, of course, have a revenue interest in denying the full
step up to as much property as possible, within the bounds of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. This is especially so in the case of commingling, and other situa-
tions to be discussed infra, because the power to create community property
lies in the hands of taxpayers and not immediately with the state itself. How-
ever, it would seem that the Service is acquiescing for now. In any case,
because the Service's silence leaves the issue of commingling unclear, it is not
advisable to use this method for highly appreciated separate property. A couple
wishing to ensure the full step up might wish to use the slightly safer method of
a transmutation agreement to solidify their claim to the full step up. I
The Service has not clarified its position on the effectiveness of commin-
gling transmutations for purposes of § 1014(b)(6), but a number of factors
seem to suggest that it is forgiving in the matter. Indeed, it seems that such
transmutations are effective anyway, regardless of the Service's position,
because they fall within the plain language of the statute. However, it will take
a clear statement from either the IRS or the courts to end the debate.
B. Agreements to Live in Universal Community
Similar to commingling, couples in some community property states can
enter into agreements to live in universal community that effectively transmutes
all their separate property to community property under state law.38 Again, the
IRS has not spoken clearly on whether it considers such transmutations effec-
tive for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). But even more so than with commingling,
there is evidence to suggest that the IRS accepts such agreements as effective
transmutations for § 1014(b)(6) purposes.
In a typical universal community agreement, husband and wife execute an
agreement to transmute all of their current separate property and even any
37 See supra Part A.
38 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 850(b) (West 2004).
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future separate property they may acquire into community property. In many
states, this is unquestionably a permissible means of transmutation of separate
property into community property.3 9 Similar to commingling, with these
agreements the taxpayer has the power to create more community property than
the state would otherwise create, yet community property created by such
agreements is clearly community property "under the community property laws
of any State . . ."o Again, it is unclear how the IRS will regard such agree-
ment-created community property, but a number of factors suggest that the
Service does or will accept universal community agreements as a valid means
of transmuting separate property to community property for purposes. of
§ 1014(b)(6).
First, as with commingling, the case law suggests that the courts will con-
sider such agreements effective for purposes of the full step up in basis. While
the issue has yet to be addressed directly, courts generally find such agreements
effective for purposes of other federal taxes.4 1 For instance, in Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Association v. Commissioner, the prede-
cessor to the Tax Court found a universal community agreement transmutation
valid for purposes of the federal estate tax because the agreement effectively
transmuted the property under California law.42 The Tax Court also came to a
similar conclusion regarding the federal gift tax in Damner v. Commissioner..3
Again, while these cases do not deal with § 1014(b)(6), they seem to suggest
that for general federal tax purposes, universal community agreements are, an
effective means of transmuting separate property to community property.
Second, the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death
Act regards separate property transmuted by agreement to be community prop-
erty.' The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws believes
such transmutations should be effective generally, suggesting that such trans-
mutatious should be effective for purposes of § 1014(b)(6).45
Third, as with commingling, universal community agreements are regu-
larly recommended by estate planners as a means of transmuting separate prop-
erty into community property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). 4 This suggests
that the practice is common and that the IRS does not wish to contest it.
39 See, e.g., TEXAS CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1999); Sweeney v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 1287,
1292-93 (1929) (Washington); Aronow v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (1970) (Califor-
nia); Stockdale v. Stockdale, 643 P.2d 82, 85-86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
40 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
41 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A. 695, 698 (1941).
42 Id.; Sweeney, 15 B.T.A. at 1292-93 (federal estate tax); Estate of Young v. Comm'r, 110
T.C. 297, 303 (1998) (holding that in general, property may be transmuted by agreement for
purposes of the federal estate tax).
43 Damner v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 638, 642 (1944).
44 UNIF. DIsPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RiGHTS AT DEATH ACT § 1 (Comment) (1971) ("Sub-
section (1) is designed to cover ... any property which was not originally community prop-
erty but became such by agreement .
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., W. Peter Burns, Marital Estate Planning, 189 PLI/Est 321, 329-31 (Sept./Nov.
1989); Randall, supra note 34, at 815; Carl J. Rasmussen, Divorce Provisions in Opt-In
Marital Property Agreements, 67-APR Wis. LAW. 15, 15 (1994); Sarah Ann Smith, The
Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital Agreements, Their Impact Upon Estate Plan-
ning, and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 833, 873-74
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Indeed, one commentator notes that "[E]ven though residents of the nine com-
munity property states may opt-out of or opt-in to the system at will, [for
instance via universal community agreements,] the Service has not attempted to
deny them the separate reporting of taxable income, nor the full basis adjust-
ment of I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6). '4 7 This inaction suggests that the IRS believes
§ 1014(b)(6) should be applied to universal community agreements, though this
is not certain.
Fourth, similar to commingling, the plain meaning of § 1014(b)(6) allows
application of § 1014(b)(6) where property has been transmuted by agreement.
Since such transmutations are effective under state law, they should also be
effective for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). Also, the discussion above of Revenue
Ruling 87-9848 supports the position that the Service will allow the full step up
for agreement-transmuted property. Such property is community property
"under the community property laws of any State .... , and the Service
seems to read this language literally.50
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, two other IRS documents strongly
suggest that the Service accepts universal community agreement transmutations
for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). In Revenue Ruling 77-359, the Service ruled on
the effect of such an agreement "for Federal incom6 tax purposes" for couples
domiciled in Washington state. 51 Also, the Service noted that the Supreme
Court of Washington has held that such agreements do effectively transmute
separate property to community property.52 "Accordingly," it wrote:
where a husband and wife residing in the State of Washington agree in writing that
all presently owned property and all property to be acquired thereafter, both real and
personal, will be community property, such agreement changes the status of presently
owned separate property and subsequently acquired separate property to community
property.
5 3
While the statement was issued under the regulations to Code § 61, it addresses
the validity of such agreements "for Federal income tax purposes." 54 Since
§ 1014(b)(6) is.part of the income tax provisions of the Code, the ruling dem-
onstrates that the IRS accepts universal community agreements in the context
of § 1014(b)(6).
Further, it would seem that the decision in Revenue Ruling 77-359 is in
keeping with the plain language of § 1014(b)(6). The law of the state of Wash-
ington, as with many other community property states, considers such agree-
ment-transmuted property to be community property, and thus it should be so
considered for purposes of § 1014(b)(6), which only requires that property be
(1991/1992); Gerald B. Treacy, Jr., Planning to Preserve the Advantages of Community
Property, 23 EST. PLAN. 24, 26, 29 (1996).
47 David G. Shaftel & Stephen E. Greer, Alaska Enacts an Optional Community Property
System Which Can Be Elected by Both Residents and Nonresidents, SD36 ALI-ABA 1, June
10-11, 1999, at 12-13.
48 See supra Part A.
49 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
50 Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 206.
51 1977-2 C.B. 24.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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considered community property "under the community property laws of any
State .... " This Revenue Ruling indicates that the Service would find that
such transmutations by agreement fit into the plain meaning of § 1014(b)(6).55
This plain meaning interpretation is bolstered by a Private Letter Ruling
issued by the Service in 1999. Husband and wife X and Y held stock in an
account under X's name.56 Subsequently, "X and Y executed a marital prop-
erty declaration and agreement confirming that all property they held, either
separately or jointly, was community property."57 Y then died and a county
superior court found the stock to be community property, based on state law.
58
The IRS ruled that the survivor, X, was entitled to the full step up under
§ 1014(b)(6). 59 Furthermore, the Service noted that this result would not stand
if the court order concerning the character of the stock was reversed.60 Though
this is a Private Letter Ruling, both the result and the cautionary note indicate
that the Service considers universal community agreements to be an effective
means of transmuting separate property to community property for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6), as long as the transmutation is valid under state law.
The five factors above generally suggest that the IRS will allow universal
community agreements to effectively transmute separate property to commu-
nity property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). First, the case law suggests that the
courts would so hold. Second, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws also seems to be in agreement on the issue. Third, the practice
seems to be both widespread and widely recommended. Thus, the Service's
inaction suggests that it will allow such transmutations for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6). Fourth, the plain language of § 1014(b)(6) seems to include such
agreement-transmuted property. Finally, both an IRS Revenue Ruling and a
Private Letter Ruling seem to indicate that the Service will find such transmuta-
tion agreements valid for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). And, as with commingling,
this result appears to be in keeping with the plain meaning of the statute. Uni-
versal community agreements do transmute separate property to community
property "under the community property laws of any State. '"61
55 In an important cautionary note, the Service added, "To the extent that the agreement
affects the income from separate property and not the separate property itself, the Service
will not permit the spouses to split that income for Federal income tax purposes where they
file separate income tax returns." Id. (quoting Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944),
1944 C.B. 166). Harmon is discussed at length in the section on the Alaska Community
Property Act. This ruling flies in the face of basic community property law. For instance,
IDAHO CODE § 32-906(1) (1980) states that income from separate property is community
property (and thus could be split). The issue seems unresolved by the Service. See the
discussion infra on the current applicability of Harmon.
56 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-17-025 (Apr. 30, 1999).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (2001).
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C. Adoption of the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act
Though commingling and universal community agreements present a rela-
tively straightforward argument for a full step up under 1014(b)(6), the out-
come is less clear when taxpayers move from a community property state to a
common law state. This section will address community property taken into a
common law state that has adopted the Uniform Disposition of Community
Property Rights at Death Act (Uniform Act).
In common law states that have adopted the Uniform Act the full step up
for couples moving to those states may be preserved. In such situations, the
IRS seems to follow the plain language of § 1014(b)(6) in finding that the full
step up is allowed,6 2 though this is a rather surprising result, as shall be seen.
The Uniform Act, as adopted in fourteen common law states, 63 generally
provides that property which is considered community property in a community
property jurisdiction, when brought into a Uniform Act state, will be treated
like community property at the death of the first spouse to die.' Specifically,
the act applies to "all personal property, wherever situated . . . which was
acquired as or became, and remained, community property under the laws of
another jurisdiction," as well as any part of any personal property or real prop-
erty in the common law jurisdiction in question that was acquired with "the
rents, issues, or income of, or the proceeds from, or in exchange for, that com-
munity property" or is "traceable to that community property. '65 The Uniform
Act provides that at the death of the first spouse, half of the property belongs to
the survivor and half "is subject to testamentary disposition [of the decedent] or
distribution under the laws of succession of [the common law] State." 66 Thus,
property that was community property in another state and is brought into a
Uniform Act state, or used to purchase property in a Uniform Act state, is still
treated like community property at death.
However, the Uniform Act does not state that it preserves the community
character of such property; it only causes it to be disposed of in a similar man-
ner at death. Furthermore, the Uniform Act is only effective at death. 67  It
does not purport to affect property during the lives of the spouses. Thus, the
situation of former community property in Uniform Act states raises the issue
62 1993 WL 1609164 (IRS FSA).
63 Adopted in Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Wyoming. ALASKA STAT.
3§ 13.41.005 to 13.41.055 (Michie 1984); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-12-101 to 28-12-113
(Michie 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-20-101 to 15-20-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45a-458 to 45a-466 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.216 to 732.228 (West
1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 510-21 to 510-30 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 391.210 to
391.260 (Michie 1974); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.261 to 557.271 (West 1975);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-9-101 to 72-9-120 (1989); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §§ 6-6.1
to 6-6.7 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31C-2 to 31C-12 (1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 112.705 to
112.775 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-197 to 64.1-206 (Michie 1982); and Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2-7-720 to 2-7-729 (Michie 1985).
64 UN1F. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT §§ 1, 3 (1971).
65 Id. § 1.
66 Id. § 3.
67 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT §§ 1, 3.
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of how the property will be treated at death. It is unclear whether the IRS will
consider the property community for purposes of 1014(b)(6).
Leading commentators are split on the issue. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, et
al., note that "no relevant authority appears to exist, [but that] section
1014(b)(6) should determine the basis of the surviving spouse's one-half inter-
est in property covered by the Uniform Act."68 William A. Reppy, Jr., how-
ever, doubts that the Uniform Act will preserve the full step up, since the act
does not explicitly claim to preserve the community character of the property in
question.69
Though the issue of preservation of community character is probably cen-
tral, the fact that the Uniform Act is only operative at death seems irrelevant. If
the Uniform Act causes property to be community property at the moment of
death, its character during the life of the decedent should not matter. In Mur-
phy v. Commissioner, a California couple converted real estate from commu-
nity property to tenancy in common and sought to invoke § 1014(b)(6).7° The
Ninth Circuit held that § 1014(b)(6) does not apply to property that was, at
some past time, held as community property.71 Murphy thus stands for the
proposition that the only characterization of property that matters for
§ 1014(b)(6) purposes is the characterization at death. Likewise, commingling
and universal community agreements appear to transmute separate property to
community property.72 But it does not seem to matter that the property was
separate property at some previous point. What matters is that property is com-
munity property at the time of death. Thus, it would seem that the fact that the
Uniform Act is only operative at death is irrelevant. What does matter is
whether the Service will characterize property controlled by the Uniform Act as
community property under § 1014(b)(6).
While the IRS has yet to squarely address the issue, there is some author-
ity indicating the Service will allow the full step up for former community
property in Uniform Act states.73 Indeed, this was the conclusion reached in a
Field Service Advisory (FSA) treating property held in the Uniform Act state of
Oregon.74 The FSA presented a situation in which a couple had sold their
community property residence in California and applied the proceeds towards a
replacement residence held jointly in the non-community property state of Ore-
gon.75 Since Oregon had enacted the Uniform Act, half of the property would
go to the survivor and half would be subject to disposition by the decedent.7 6
Surprisingly, the FSA stated that "under Oregon law, property to which the
Uniform Act applies retains its character as community property although the
68 Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Tax Planning with Consensual Community Property:
Alaska's New Community Property Law, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 615, 628 (1999).
69 E-mail from William A. Reppy, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law to
Jeremy T. Ware (Nov. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
70 342 F. 2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1965).
71 Id. at 359.
72 See supra Part A.
73 1993 WL 1609164 (IRS FSA).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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property is situated in Oregon, a noncommunity property state."'7 7 Further-
more, the FSA stated that "[in] all cases, the controlling factor is the characteri-
zation of the property under state law," which in this case allowed the full step
up.7
8
This is a surprising result because the Uniform Act does not purport to
preserve the character of community property as community property. The
Uniform Act only allows the property to be disposed of at death in a manner
similar to community property in the adopting common law state.79 And yet
this FSA held that property controlled by the Uniform Act which is disposed of
in this manner has actually retained its community character and is entitled to
the full step up.80 In other words, the IRS seems to be saying that if former
community property is disposed of as community property, its character as
community property has been preserved for purposes of § 1014(b)(6).
Though this FSA indicates a forgiving IRS stance on property covered by
the Uniform Act, great caution should be taken in relying on it. First, as an
FSA, it cannot be used as precedent.8" Second, as discussed, its reasoning
seems faulty. Just as commingling and universal community agreements prob-
ably will allow the full step up because they transmute separate property to
community property under state law, the Uniform Act probably should not
allow the full step up, because property under the Uniform Act does not seem
to retain its community character. However, at present, the IRS has at least
indicated that it does consider the Uniform Act to preserve the character of
community property upon a move to an adopting common law state, and thus
may allow the application of § 1014(b)(6).
D. Changes in Marital Domicile from a Community Property to a Common
Law State
Though the IRS seems to liberally permit the application of 1014(b)(6)
with commingling, universal community agreements, and perhaps even the
Uniform Act, this has not been the case with changes in marital domicile from
a community property to a common law state.82 As with commingling and
universal community agreements, the characterization of property under state
law is exceedingly important, if not dispositive, so the effect of such marital
domicile changes on the state law characterization of community property must
be explored before progressing to the probable IRS response to this issue.
A move from a community property to a common law state generally has
one of two effects. The common law state may hold that when a couple moves
to the state, or exchanges separate property there, their community property
automatically transmutes to some form of separate common law co-owner-
ship.8 3 In these cases, the IRS will probably not allow the full step up. Alter-
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT § 3 (1971)
80 1993 WL 1609164 (IRS FSA).
81 Id.; I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
82 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-80, 1968-1 C.B. 348.
83 See, e.g., Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (But the
court did seem to suggest that if the community property had not been exchanged in Florida,
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
natively, some common law states preserve the community property character
of transported property.84 In these states the IRS will arguably allow the full
step up, though this issue is still unclear.
1. Common Law States Requiring a Change in Ownership Form for
Community Property
The majority rule is that initial ownership of moveable property is deter-
mined by the law of the marital domicile at the time of acquisition.85 For
instance, in the leading case of Quintana v. Ordono a husband domiciled in
Cuba, which was a community property jurisdiction at that time, purchased
stock with money he earned in Florida, a common law jurisdiction.86 The court
wrote,
Whether the source of the purchase price of the stock was from enterprises within
Cuba or Florida is not material. What is material and not in conflict is that the hus-
band and wife were domiciled in Cuba at the time of the acquisition of the stock...
by the almost unanimous authority in America, the "Interests of one spouse in mov-
ables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the law of the
domicile of the parties when the movables are acquired."87
Under Quintana, if a couple is domiciled in a community property state
and acquires moveable property in a common law state, the property will still
be community property, assuming the state of domicile considers it to be
such.88 Real property characterization, however, is typically governed by the
law of the situs of the property.89 The situation is more complicated, however,
when moveable community property is transported into a common law state
upon a change of domicile.
Some states will force a transmutation of community property to some
form of separate common law co-ownership when a couple moves from a com-
munity property state to a common law state or subsequently exchanges their
community property in that state.90 Under community property law theory,
transported community property, or any property for which it is exchanged,
it might have remained community property); Stone v. Sample,63 So.2d 307, 308-09 (Miss.
1953); Depas v. Mayo, 1848 WL 4002 at *4 (Mo. 1848); In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d 94,
95 (Mont. 1951) (in dicta); Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694, 707 (N.D. 1964); Edwards v.
Edwards, 233 P. 477, 485 (Okla. 1924); 40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955).
84 See, e.g., Dunbar v. Bejarano, 358 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Colo. 1961).
85 See, e.g., Quintana, 195 So.2d at 579. But there are a few rare cases where courts have
adopted a significant relationships test, instead, to determine the applicable law. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Crichton, 228 N.E.2d 799, 805-06 (N.Y. 1967); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v.
Lapp, 622 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1980).
86 Quintana, 195 So.2d at 578.
87 Id. at 579 (quoting RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 (1934)).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 578. The approach for moveable property differs from that for real property, where
the characterization is typically governed by the law of the situs of the property. See, e.g.,
Stone, 63 So.2d at 308-09.
90 See, e.g., Quintana, 1985 So.2d at 580; Stone, 63 So.2d at 308-09; Depas v. Mayo, 1848
WL 4002 at *4 (Mo. 1848); In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d 94, 95 (Mont. 1951) (in dicta);
Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694, 707 (N.D. 1964); Edwards v. Edwards, 233 P. 477, 485
(Okla. 1924); 40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955).
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should remain community property. 9 ' But common law state courts often do
not understand community property sufficiently to preserve the community
property character of such property, or do not wish to. This issue usually only
arises when a couple actually exchanges community property for other property
within the common law state. Because courts address the issue primarily in
situations of exchange, and many cases concern real property acquired in a
common law state, it is unclear whether the forced transmutation happens upon
a simple change of domicile, or whether an exchange is required. 92 The case
law suggests that some of the common law states in question intend the forced
transmutation to be imposed automatically upon the change of domicile,
regardless of whether or not the community property has been exchanged for
other property. 93 But at least upon exchange, and probably upon a simple
change of domicile to some of these common law states, couples are forced to
transmute their community property to some form of common law ownership,
destroying the community nature of their property.94
Two solutions are usually employed by common law states to deal with
spouses' vested interests in former community property which has undergone a
forced transmutation. Sometimes, if the community property was exchanged
for new property and title to the new property was taken jointly, the common
law state forces the couple to take the new property in some form of common
law ownership.95 For instance, in Rozan v. Rozan, a California couple bought
North Dakota land with community property.9 6 The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia found that the North Dakota real estate was thus community property,97 but
recognized that it could not affect title to land in another jurisdiction.9 8 Despite
this ruling, the North Dakota Supreme Court held,
[The u]se of community funds did not impart the status or character of community
property, with all its varied and unique incidents, to the so acquired North Dakota
lands. Upon acquisition, using community property funds, each party in this instance
acquired a separate yet undivided one-half ownership interest in the North Dakota
real property...99
Thus, North Dakota will require that property acquired with community prop-
erty in that state be taken as separate property, destroying the community
9' See, e.g., Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 759 (Cal. 1944) ("[Community] property
rights are not lost simply because property is transported into another state and exchanged
there for other property.")
92 See, e.g., Quintana, 1985 So.2d at 580; Stone, 63 So.2d at 308-09; Depas, 1848 WL
4002 at *4; In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d at 95 (in dicta); Rozan, 129 N.W.2d at 707;
Edwards, 233 P. at 485; 40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955).
93 See, e.g., Quintana, 1985 So.2d at 580; Stone, 63 So.2d at 308-09; Depas, 1848 WL
4002 at *4; In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d at 95 (in dicta); Rozan, 129 N.W.2d at 707;
Edwards, 233 P. at 485; 40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955).
94 See, e.g., Quintana, 1985 So.2d at 580; Stone, 63 So.2d at 308-09; Depas, 1848 WL
4002 at *4; In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d at 95 (in dicta); Rozan, 129 N.W.2d at 707;
Edwards, 233 P. at 485; 40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955).
95 Rozan, 129 N.W.2d at 707.
96 Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 327 (1957).
97 Id. at 327.
98 Id. at 330.
99 Rozan, 129 N.W.2d at 707.
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nature of the property.'0° No other states could be found that have addressed
this issue, but this seems to be the outcome that other common law states would
reach as well.
Under the second approach, community property is exchanged for new
property and title to the property is taken in the name of one spouse alone. In a
community property state, such property would still often be considered com-
munity property. 10' But in many common law states, taking title in such a
fashion vests the full interest in the named spouse (often the husband).' °2
Because the community property exchanged for such solely-titled property
belonged half to the other spouse (often the wife), many common law states
will create a resulting trust in favor of this spouse to protect her half interest in
the newly acquired property. 10 3 This result, as above, forces the couple to
transmute community property to a common law form of joint ownership,
destroying the community nature of the property.
If a state forces a couple to change ownership from community property to
some form of joint ownership or to a resulting trust, the loss of the community
nature of the property almost certainly destroys the ability to take advantage of
the full step up. Leading commentators have come to this same conclusion.' °4
And, more importantly, both a Ninth Circuit case and a Revenue Ruling sup-
port the denial of the application of § 1014(b)(6) in such cases.' 05
In Murphy v. Commissioner, a California couple converted some real
estate from community property to tenancy in common. 10 6 First the Service
and then the court denied the application of § 1014(b)(6), holding that the pro-
vision does not apply to property that was held as community property in the
past. 10 7 The key issue in Murphy was the character of the property under state
law at the time of death.' 8 Though this case did not deal with a move between
states, it is analogous in that it deals with property formerly held as community
property but now held in a form of separate joint ownership.' 9 Thus, Murphy
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 759 (Cal. 1944).
102 See, e.g., In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d 94, 99 (Mont. 1951).
103 See, e.g., Quintana v. Ordono, 1985 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Stone v.
Sample, 63 So.2d 307, 308-09 (Miss. 1953); Depas v. Mayo, 1848 WL 4002 at *4 (Mo.
1848); Edwards v. Edwards, 233 P. 477, 485; In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d at 95 (in dicta);
40 Md. Aty. Gen. Op. 526 (1955). But see In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d at 99 (Supreme
Court of Montana, misinterpreting California law, found that the wife had no vested interest
in the community property used to purchase Montana real estate, and thus refused to impose
a resulting trust.); Commonwealth v. Terjen, 90 S.E.2d 801, 804-05 (Va. 1956) (Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals wrongly relied on In re Hunter for an analysis of California law
and came to the same conclusion as to wife's vested interest). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 732.216 - 732.228 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-9-101 - 72-9-120 (1993) (Flor-
ida and Montana have since adopted the Uniform Act, perhaps changing their position on the
issue of forced conversion of ownership forms).
104 WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATEs 600-01 (6th ed. 2004).
105 Murphy v. Comm'r, 342 F. 2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 68-80, 1968-1 C.B.
348.
'06 Murphy, 342 F. 2d at 358.
107 Id. at 359.
108 Id. at 358-59.
109 Id. at 358.
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strongly suggests that in cases where parties move to states which force such
changes in form of ownership, courts will not allow the full step up in basis.
The IRS takes this position, as well.' 10 Revenue Ruling 68-80 concerned
a couple that moved from New Mexico, a community property state, to Vir-
ginia, a common law state.111 The couple exchanged community property for a
piece of Virginia real estate, taking title as tenants in common.' 12 The Service
said that in such situations, the surviving spouse cannot take the full step up
since "there is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or regulations that would
indicate that section 1014(b)(6) of the Code relating to 'community property
held' was intended to include separate property that had previously been con-
verted from community property to separate property."' 1 3 Though this situa-
tion did not involve a forced transmutation, the facts are so analogous that it
seems clear that the Service will take the same position. Revenue Ruling 68-80
strongly suggests that the IRS will not allow application of § 1014(b)(6) to
property which has been converted from community property to separate joint
ownership upon a move from a community property to a common law state.
1 14
Furthermore, the conclusions reached by Murphy, Revenue Ruling 68-80,
and the major commentators cited above all comport with the reasoning dis-
cussed under commingling, universal community agreements and the Uniform
Act. The plain language of § 1014(b)(6) says that community property is prop-
erty which is community property "under the community property laws of any
State." 15 In cases where a move has forced a switch to common law owner-
ship forms, the property has ceased to be community property under the laws of
the state. Under a plain language interpretation, it is quite reasonable that the
IRS should deny the application of § 1014(b)(6). It would seem consistent for
the Service to allow application of § 1014(b)(6) to commingling and universal
community agreements, as well as (perhaps) to agreements under the Uniform
Act, but not to changes of common law ownership forms upon moves to com-
mon law states.
While the approach may be consistent, the result is unfair The community
property system should be respected by common law states not only to protect
migrating couples' full step up interests, but also to preserve their other com-
munity property interests as well. While it may seem fair for the Service to
deny the full step up in cases where couples have voluntarily chosen to separate
their property, it seems less fair to deny it in cases where couples were forced
to change ownership form simply because they moved to a common law state
and exchanged community property there. Nonetheless, the Service would be
acting well within the plain meaning of § 1014(b)(6) if it were to deny applica-
tion of the provision in such cases. The resolution of the issue probably lies
with these states that force ownership form changes.
There are a number of prophylactic measures that migrating couples can
employ to possibly preserve the character of community property upon a move
110 Rev. Rul. 68-80, 1968-1 C.B. 348.
I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (2001).
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to a common law state that forces a change in ownership form. William A.
Reppy, Jr. and Cynthia A. Samuel suggest executing an agreement stating that
no change of ownership form will occur upon moving to the common law state,
assuming such an agreement would be valid in the new state. 1 6 Such an agree-
ment's "success would be enhanced if the stock certificates [or other moveable
community property] were physically retained in the former community domi-
cile."" 7 According to Gerald B. Treacy, Jr., one could also try "funding a
revocable inter vivos trust with community property and selecting the law of
the community property state as governing law.""' 8 W. Peter Burns also rec-
ommends identifying community property as such in both spouses' wills." 9
While the success of these methods is uncertain, it is possible that they could
operate to save the full step up for couples moving to a common law state
requiring a change in form of ownership of community property.
2. Common Law States That Preserve the Character of Community
Property
Some states do recognize community property, at least upon exchanges, if
not otherwise. 120 Common law states that preserve the character of community
property probably also save the full step up for couples who move to these
states with community property. 121 In short, because community property is
considered community property in these common law states, § 1014(b)(6)
likely applies.
In the leading case of People ex. rel. Dunbar v. Bejarano, the Supreme
Court of Colorado held that community property retained its character as such
even though brought into Colorado, a common law state: "[We] are of the opin-
ion that the rights incident to this form of ownership are so plain that they are
entitled to recognition."' 22 Virginia's highest court came to the same conclu-
sion in Commonwealth v. Terjen.1 23 The Supreme Court of Ohio also agreed
that community property brought into Ohio would remain community prop-
erty. 124 Additionally, Missouri appears to have come to the same conclu-
sion. 1 25 These cases do not involve exchanges, but do indicate, in opposition to
116 REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 104, at 21-25.
117 Id.
118 Treacy, supra note 46, at 29.
119 Bums, supra note 46, at 333.
120 See, e.g., People ex. rel. Dunbar v. Bejarano, 358 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961) (Colorado);
Commonwealth v. Terjen, 90 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 1956) (Virginia); In re Kessler's Estate, 203
N.E.2d 221 (Ohio 1964) (Ohio). See also In re Estate of Perry, 480 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1972)
(Missouri) and note 63 supra (listing states having adopted the Uniform Community Prop-
erty rights at Death Act).
121 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
122 358 p.2d at 868-69.
123 90 S.E.2d at 802-03.
124 In re Kessler's Estate, 203 N.E.2d at 222-23.
25 In re Estate of Perry, 480 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1972). An old leading case in the state,
Depas v. Mayo, said that community property exchanged for Missouri real estate taken in the
husband's name became the separate property of the husband, with a resulting trust in favor
of the wife. 1848 WL 4002 at *4 (Mo. 1848). But in In re Estate of Perry, the Supreme
Court of Missouri considered personal community property of a Texas couple left on a Mis-
souri ranch. The court held, "Without any doubt, Texas community property laws of the
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the cases in the preceding subsection, a willingness by these states' courts to
recognize and preserve community property when brought into these states. In
addition, as discussed in the preceding section, many states have adopted the
Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act (Uniform
Act), which may also preserve the character of community property in the
adopting states.126
Colorado and Virginia are among the states that have adopted the Uniform
Act and the decisions discussed above were decided before these adoptions. It
is not clear how their adoptions of the Uniform Act will impact the holdings in
these two cases, but it probably will not affect them much. These cases hold
that community property brought into the states remains community prop-
erty, 12 presumably both during life and through death. The Uniform Act does
not affect property during life and only states that that which was community
property under another state's law will be disposed of as such in the adopting
state. 128 The Uniform Act does not force community property to be transmuted
to common law ownership and then subsequently disposed of as community
property at death. It is designed to deal with property that had to be transmuted
but ought to be disposed of as community property at death. Since Colorado
and Virginia apparently preserve the character of community property anyway,
the Uniform Act probably adds nothing to the character of imported community
property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6).
The IRS has not spoken on the issue of how community property pre-
served as such in common law states will be treated under § 1014(b)(6), but
two factors may suggest that it will allow the full step up. First, by the plain
language of § 1014(b)(6), it would seem that the Service would have to allow
the full step up in these situations. Community property is considered to be
community property under the laws of these states.1 29 As seen in the previous
sections, the IRS tends to allow application of § 1014(b)(6) when property is
considered community property under state law.
Second, as discussed in the Uniform Act section, the Oregon FSA sug-
gests that the IRS will allow the full step up upon a move to a state that pre-
serves the character of community property.130 That FSA, one will recall,
concerned a couple who moved from California to Oregon and exchanged com-
munity property for a piece of Oregon real estate.1 3 1 Because the property was
considered community property under Oregon's version of the Uniform Act,
the IRS stated that § 1014(b)(6) should apply. 13 2 Though the Oregon FSA
nonresident appellant and her deceased spouse.., control her property rights in the personal
property having a situs in this state at the time of his death ... [The presumption has not
been rebutted that] all of the property was and is community property." In re Estate of Perry,
480 S.W.2d at 894-95, 896. Though this case did not involve a change of domicile to the
common law state in question, it suggests that Missouri may recognize community property
when brought into the state by couples moving there.
126 See infra §§ 1 and 3.
127 Dunbar, 338 P.2d 866; Commonwealth v. Terjen, 90 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 1956).
128 UNIF. DIsPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT § 3.
129 Dunbar, 358 P.2d at 868-69.
130 1993 WL 1609164 (IRS FSA).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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dealt with a version of the Uniform Act, the situation is analogous to those in
which a couple moves to a common law state that preserves the character of
their community property. In fact, the case for the full step up is stronger in
these states because their courts explicitly state that community property
remains community property, whereas the Uniform Act only instructs that for-
mer community property be treated like community property at death. 133 Thus,
if the Service will allow the application of § 1014(b)(6) for property under the
Uniform Act, it likely will allow it in cases where common law states have
preserved the nature of community property brought into these states.
Though the IRS has not spoken directly on point, the plain language of
§ 1014(b)(6), the FSA discussed above, and the dispositions of these states'
courts suggests that the IRS will allow the full step up for community property
brought into these common law states by couples moving to them.
3. Conclusion to Changes in Marital Domicile Issues
The effect of a move from a community property state to a common law
state depends on the law of the common law state. If the common law state has
adopted the Uniform Act, the couple may get the full step up. 134 For states that
require community property to be converted to a form of common law owner-
ship upon exchange, § 1014(b)(6) probably will not apply. For states that pre-
serve the character of community property brought into them, the IRS may
allow the application of § 1014(b)(6). Again, these conclusions are not certain,
but the evidence suggests them.
E. Community Property with Right of Survivorship
An interesting area of community property that has not been extensively
explored is community property with right of survivorship (CPWROS). The
IRS has yet to speak authoritatively on the subject, but it seems that CPWROS
could receive the full step up in basis under § 1014(b)(6). Many commentators
believe that this hybrid will receive the § 1014(b)(6) full step up in basis' 35
though others strongly disagree. 136
Community property with right of survivorship is allowed in most com-
munity property states,' 37 and is a hybrid of community property and joint
133 Dunbar, 358 P.2d at 868-69; UNIF. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH AcT
§§ 1, 3.
134 I.R.C. 1014(b)(6).
135 See, e.g., Arthur W. Andrews, Community Property with Right of Survivorship: Uneasy
Lies the Head that Wears a Crown of Surviving Spouse for Federal Income Tax Basis Pur-
poses, 17 VA. TAX REV. 577 (1998), Robert B. Fleming, The Top Ten Changes in the New
Uniform Probate Code, ARIZ. ATrr'y, Aug./Sept. 1994, at 35.
136 Andrews, supra note 135; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 104 at 3-20, quoted in
Andrews, supra note 135, at n.29. ("[I]t is not firmly settled that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice will treat this hybrid as community property to give a stepped up basis to a surviving
spouse's half interest.").
131 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1201(28) (West 1995), 33-431 C. & D. (West Supp.
1996); IDAHO CODE § 15-6-201 (Michie 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 111.064.2. (Michie
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-8.B. (Michie 1994), 45-2-805.A. (Michie 1995); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 451 (West Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.28.040.(1) (West
1994).
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tenancy with right of survivorship (JTWROS). Generally, the property is
treated as standard community property during life, but at death it passes to the
survivor outside of the will just as it would with JTWROS property. 138 Thus,
the couple gets the burdens and benefits of community property ownership dur-
ing life and then the property is transferred to the survivor "without incurring
the costs of probate, while at the same time preserving the usual 'stepped up'
[fair market value] date of death basis for the survivor's own one half
interest." 
139
The general belief that CPWROS will receive the full step up is based on
Revenue Ruling 87-98."4° This ruling, discussed under the commingling and
universal community agreement sections, concerned a couple living in a com-
munity property state that took title to real property as JTWROS. a14  Though
the property was held as JTWROS, the Service ruled that it was community
property under state law, because of a recitation in the couple's wills that the
property was community property. 142 Thus, the Service allowed the full step
up. 143 However, one must also guess that the right of survivorship was not
operable because the property had been found to be community property under
state law and not JTWROS. Thus, the analogy between the JTWROS in this
ruling and CPWROS generally may not hold water, because the property in
question here was merely community property with no right of survivorship.
The situation is unclear, at best, but based on this ruling, it may be reasonable
to believe that the IRS will allow the application of § 1014(b)(6) for CPWROS.
Arthur W. Andrews, however, argues that CPWROS will probably not
receive the benefit of the full step up because half of it will not be included in
the decedent's estate as required by § 1014(b)(6).' 44 There is no debate that
CPWROS will be considered community property for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6), 14 5 it is generally considered community property under state
law.' 46 However, section 1014(b)(6) does require that "at least one-half of the
whole of the community interest in such property was includible in determining
the value of the decedent's gross estate."' 147 Andrews notes that there are only
two sections under the federal estate tax that might cause the necessary inclu-
sion. 148 If neither of these sections operate to include half of the CPWROS in
the decedent's estate, then § 1014(b)(6) cannot apply.
138 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.040.(1) (West 1994).
139 Andrews, supra note 135, at 582 (stating the common view).
140 Id. at 582-83.
141 Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 206.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Andrews, supra note 135, at 605-07.
145 See, e.g., id. at 604 (quoting M. Phillips, Federal Tax Implications of The Wisconsin
Marital Property Act (3d special ed.), TAX PRACT. NEWSLETTER (IRS Milwaukee District),
Apr. 1988, at 1, reprinted in HOWARD S. ERLANGER, MARITAL PROPERTY, TAXATION, AND
ESTATE PLANNING IN WISCONSIN A-3 (1991)).
146 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.040(1) (West 1994).
147 Andrews, supra note 135, at 584.
148 Id. at 599.
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The first section which might cause inclusion is § 2033.14 9 It states, "the
value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
the interest therein of the decedent at the time of death."' 150 But CPWROS, by
its very nature, is designed so that the decedent has no interest at death, but
rather, the property passes by operation of law to the surviving spouse. Thus,
Andrews points out that § 2033 will not cause inclusion because "the dece-
dent's interest was extinguished at death and is not part of the probate
estate."' 5 1 Therefore, another provision of the federal estate tax must be found
to cause inclusion of the CPWROS or § 1014(b)(6) cannot apply.
The only other possible provision that might cause inclusion is § 2040
which deals with joint interests. Subsection (b) of § 2040 addresses joint inter-
ests between husband and wife. 152 It states that the gross estate shall include
half of the couple's sole joint interest in property held as "tenants by the
entirety" or "joint tenants with right of survivorship."' 153 It does not state that it
includes CPWROS. Andrews points out that the two terms in § 2040 utilize:
very specific and technical property law terminology which has an established mean-
ing based upon the common law origins of these tenancies as embellished by state
statutes. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the statute on its face is unambiguous
as to its application. This is because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[W]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common
law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms." Since community property has
different historical roots and attributes ... it seems clear that these tenancies do not
encompass community property.' 
54
Thus, Andrews concludes that § 2040 will not cause inclusion of half of the
CPWROS in the decedent's estate. 1 55 As a result, he concludes that CPWROS
cannot receive the full step up in basis, because it does not fulfill the inclusion
requirement of § 1014(b)(6).
Andrews analyzes the two IRS documents that address CPWROS. The
first is Revenue Ruling 87-98. Andrews argues that the Ruling should be disre-
garded because the Service specifically states that half of the JTWROS prop-
erty (which was found to be community property) "was included in
[decedent]'s estate for federal estate tax purposes." '156 Andrews maintains that
by making this assumption, without explanation, the IRS has avoided address-
ing the question of whether CWPROS will be included in the decedent's estate
and has added nothing to the CPWROS issue.
1 57
While there are few IRS documents on CPWROS, there is a Tax Practi-
tioner Newsletter from the IRS District Director in Milwaukee that addresses
149 I.R.C. § 2033 (2001).
150 Id.
15' Andrews, supra note 135, at 599.
152 I.R.C. § 2040(b) (2001).
15 Id. § 2040(b)(2).
154 Andrews, supra note 135, at 588-89 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,
329 (1981)).
155 Id. at 599.
156 Id. at 600 (quoting Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 206).
157 Id. at 602.
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the issue.158 This document deals with "survivorship marital property," the
Wisconsin equivalent of CPWROS. 159 In the newsletter, the District Director
wrote, "based upon advice received from the National Office, survivorship
marital property will definitely be considered community property for federal
income tax basis purposes. This means, upon the death of the first spouse, a
full step up in basis will be received under I.R.C. section 1014."' 60 Though
this statement seems clear cut, it does not, Andrews points out, address whether
CPWROS will be included in the gross estate; it simply seems to assume it.' 6'
Thus, as with Revenue Ruling 87-98, this document adds little to the analysis
of the CPWROS situation.
However, Andrews's analysis of CPWROS inclusion hinges on an exceed-
ingly technical reading of § 2040 that may not be applied in practice. Section
2040(b)(2)(B) includes property held as "joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship" in the gross estate. While Andrews correctly argues that this term is a
"very specific and technical property law [term] which has an established
meaning,"' 162 it seems unlikely that the IRS would give such a technical reading
of the statute since the language could easily cover CPWROS. Thus, the Ser-
vice may very well conclude that § 2040(b)(2)(B) causes inclusion of
CPWROS, which would allow the full step up.
This view is buttressed by the Tax Practitioner Newsletter from the IRS
District Director in Milwaukee, discussed above. 16 3 There, again, the District
Director wrote, "based upon advice received from the National Office, survi-
vorship marital property will definitely be considered community property for
federal income tax basis purposes. This means, upon the death of the first
spouse, a full step up in basis will be received under I.R.C. section 1 0 14 .'""
Andrews notes that this document assumes inclusion of CPWROS without any
analysis of how this could occur. 16 5 But it is not unreasonable to think that the
Service did, in fact, decide without noting it that CPWROS was includible
under § 2040(b)(2)(B) and entitled to the full step up. In any case, based on the
Tax Practitioner Newsletter the IRS seems to be willing to include CPWROS in
the gross estate and, thereby, to allow the full step up.
Presently, it is unclear what the IRS response to CPWROS will be for
purposes of § 1014(b)(6). Andrews' analysis of the inclusion issue is not
unreasonable. However, the two IRS documents discussed indicate a rather
forgiving IRS attitude on the subject. This may be, as Andrews notes, simply
because the Service has not thought about the inclusion issue.1 6 6 On the other
hand, it may be because the Service intends to apply § 2040(b)(2)(B) to include
CPWROS in the decedent's estate, allowing the full step up in basis.
158 Id. at 604.
159 Id. at 603-04.
160 Id. at 604 (quoting M. Phillips, supra note 145, at 1, reprinted in ERLANGER, supra note
145, at A-3).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 588.
163 Id. at 604.
164 Id. at 604 (quoting M. Phillips, supra note 145, at 1, reprinted in ERLANGER, supra note
145, at A-3).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 601-05.
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F. The Alaska Community Property Act's Elective Regime
In 1998, Alaska passed the Alaska Community Property Act, which cre-
ated an elective community property regime in the state.167 The Alaska regime
functions like any other community property regime except that residents must
choose to opt-in to the system, if they want it to apply, and they must choose
which of their property will be held as community property.168 Because of the
regime's elective nature, a debate has raged ever since its adoption as to
whether Alaska community property will be considered community property
for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). 169 The evidence is unclear, as is the Service's
position, but it is an essential question, since it concerns the fate of an entire
state's community property regime for purposes of § 1014(b)(6).
Because Alaska's community property laws are derived from the Uniform
Marital Property Act and are similar to Wisconsin's IRS-approved community
property regime, some believe that Alaska community property will be commu-
nity property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). 170 But the Alaska Community
Property Act contains one major difference from Wisconsin's laws: the Alaska
act only applies if resident couples opt-in to the system.17 The imposition of
the regime is not automatic; rather, taxpayers must proactively choose to live in
community.' 72 The elective nature of the regime calls into question whether
the Service will allow the full step up for Alaska community property.
This doubt arises from Oklahoma's experiment with elective community
property in the 1940s and the subsequent United States Supreme Court case of
Harmon, in which the Court found that elective community property was not
community property for purposes of the federal income tax. 173 Harmon con-
cerned an Oklahoma couple who had elected to apply Oklahoma's community
property regime to themselves in order to split their income for federal tax
purposes (which lowered their income tax burden as to ordinary income under
the applicable law). 174
The question in Harmon was whether such an elective regime was more
like a typical community property regime, which validly splits income,1 75 or
more like the fact pattern in Lucas v. Earl, the classic federal income tax case
in which the taxpayers' income split was disallowed.' 7 6 In Lucas v. Earl, the
husband had assigned half of his income to his wife, after which the couple
tried to split the income for federal income tax reporting. 177 As the Court
wrote in Harmon, "Under Lucas v. Earl an assignment of income to be earned
or to accrue in the future, even though authorized by state law . . . is ineffec-
tive to render the income immune from taxation as that of the assignor. "178
167 Alaska Community Property Act, ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.010-.995 (Michie 1998).
168 Alaska Community Property Act § 34.77.030.
169 See, e.g., Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47; Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68.
170 See, e.g., Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 624.
171 Alaska Community Property Act § 34.77.030.
172 Id.
173 Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1944).
174 Id. at 45.
175 See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
176 Harmon, 323 U.S. at 45-46.
177 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930).
178 Harmon, 323 U.S. at 46.
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In Harmon, the Court found Oklahoma's elective regime to be more like
Lucas v. Earl, and thus it was not a valid community property system for pur-
poses of the federal income tax. 179 "Communities are of two sorts," the Court
wrote, "consensual and legal. A consensual community arises out of contract
[as in Lucas v. Earl]," whereas a legal community is created automatically
under state law upon marriage.18° The Court even stated,
[We] assume that, once established, the community property status of Oklahoma
spouses is at least equal to that of man and wife in [basically] any community prop-
erty State... The important fact is that the community system of Oklahoma is not a
system, dictated by State policy, as an incident of matrimony.
18 1
The automatic nature of traditional community property regimes is the key to
their validity for federal income tax purposes, concerning the splitting of
income. Thus, it would seem that any elective community property regime
runs afoul of Harmon and will be declared invalid for federal income tax pur-
poses, including § 1014(b)(6).
Though the IRS has not spoken on the validity of the Alaskan regime or
the applicability of Harmon, there are numerous arguments against a reading of
Harmon that holds elective community property regimes must always fail for
purposes of § 1014(b)(6).18 2
First, according to Blattmachr, et al., Harmon was decided before the pas-
sage of § 1014(b)(6), but only by a scant four years, and yet the legislative
history of this section makes no mention of a differentiation between opt-in
(elective) and opt-out (traditional) community property regimes.' 83 Arguably,
if Congress intended § 1014(b)(6) to apply to only one type of community
property regime it would have said so in the wake of Harmon.
Second, section 1014(b)(6) explicitly applies to that which is community
property "under the community property laws of ... any foreign country .... ,"
probably including the German system, which seems to require election.'84
Indeed, a footnote in a 1986 Tax Court case states, "Petitioner [taxpayer] ...
originally argued that he and his wife had elected an optional marital regime
knows [sic] as gutergemeinschaft, which respondent[, the IRS,] concedes is a
community property regime."' 85 In this case, the taxpayer, a German nonresi-
dent alien, had reported only half of his income to the IRS, since he argued that
the other half inured directly to his wife under Germany's elective community
property regime.' 86 The IRS, in a seeming disavowal of Harmon, at first con-
ceded that this elective regime was indeed a community property regime, but
ultimately the argument was moot because the taxpayer conceded that he and
his spouse had never actually elected community property treatment. 187 Com-
mentators Shaftel and Greer point out that it is unclear whether Harmon was
179 Id. at 47-49.
180 id. at 46.
181 Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
182 See, e.g., Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47; Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68.
183 Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 630.
184 Id. at 630 n.66.
185 Angerhofer v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 814, 816 n.4 (1986).
186 Id. at 816.
187 Id.
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addressed in this concession, 188 but the concession implies that Harmon may
not apply to Alaska's elective regime.
Third, Justice Douglas makes a convincing argument in his dissent in Har-
mon that there is a strong consensual nature to traditional community property
regimes, as well:189 Douglas asks, is not marriage itself a contract that the
spouses choose to enter into, just as the taxpayers entered into an assignment of
income contract in Lucas v. Earl?'90 Is not a move to a community property
state, which thus creates community property in the future, a consensual act by
the spouses?' 9' Indeed, cannot spouses, upon such a move, even consensually
transmute their separate property to community property by a universal com-
munity agreement? 92 Citing Douglas' dissent on this final point, Shaftel and
Greer write, "It seems unfair for the Internal Revenue Service to acquiesce in
this 'consensual' characteristic of existing community property states, yet deny
it to elective community property systems."' 93 Other commentators have
agreed with this sentiment. 94 In light of these arguments, the case for
extending Harmon to invalidate Alaska's community property regime seems
weak at best.
Instead, most commentators believe that Harmon should be limited to the
facts of the case - assignment of income situations, not the validity of elective
community property regimes for purposes of § 1014(b)(6).1 95 As Shaftel and
Greer note, "this may well be the Service's position."' 196 They then go on to
cite Revenue Ruling 77-359, discussed supra, in which the Service ruled that a
universal community agreement effectively transmuted separate property to
community property.' 9 7 But at the end of the ruling, the Service adds this
telling cautionary note: "To the extent that the agreement affects the income
from separate property and not the separate property itself, the Service will not
permit the spouses to split that income for Federal income tax purposes where
they file separate income tax returns."' 98 Thus, Shaftel and Greer note, the
Service is perhaps limiting Harmon to the assignment of income context.
1 99
Most commentators believe that this should be the result and that Alaska com-
munity property should receive the benefit of the full step up in basis.200
Needless to say, the applicability of Harmon to Alaska community prop-
erty is far from clear. Harmon may stand for the proposition that any commu-
nity property produced by an elective regime will not be considered community
188 Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 25 n.89.
189 Harmon, 323 U.S. at 50-57.
190 Id. at 53.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 54.
193 Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 13.
194 Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 629.
195 Id.; Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 13-14.
196 Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 13.
197 Id.; Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-2 C.B. 24.
198 Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-2 C.B. 24; as stated in supra note 49, this ruling flies in the face
of basic community property law. For instance, IDAHO CODE § 32-906(1) (Michie 2004)
states that income from separate property is community property (and thus can be split). The
issue seems unresolved by the Service.
199 Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 13.
200 Id. at 14; Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 629-30.
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property for purposes of federal taxation, including § 1014(b)(6). Or Harmon
may, as suggested by Revenue Ruling 77-359, be limited to the assignment of
income context, meaning that for purposes of the full step up, elective commu-
nity property will be considered community property. Or Harmon may be
overruled at its first challenge by an Alaskan resident, due to the logical incon-
sistencies in its reasoning, as pointed out by Justice Douglas' dissent. Such a
resident is sure to be supported by a vigorous amicus curiae brief by the state of
Alaska. For now, however, the validity of Alaska's elective community prop-
erty regime remains a mystery.
G. Community Property Trusts Created By Community Property State
Residents
Another important area of community property that has long caused con-
fusion is whether community property used by community property state
residents to fund trusts remains community property for purposes of
§ 1014(b)(6). The answer is unequivocally yes, as long as such property
remains community property under state law and half of its value is includible
in the decedent's gross estate. 0 1
In Revenue Ruling 66-283, the IRS considered a revocable trust funded
with community property by California residents.20 2 The Service noted that
community property held by a trustee retains its community character under
California law (unless the grantors provide otherwise) and that the federal
estate tax provisions caused inclusion of half the trust in the estate of the first
spouse to die.203 Thus, the Service ruled that the trust property was community
property and received the full step up under § 1014(b)(6).2 4 This, of course,
fits within the plain language of § 1014(b)(6), which requires that the commu-'
nity property be community property under state law and that half of the prop-
erty be included in the estate of the first spouse to die.
Whether state law considers community property used to fund a trust to be
community property is another question, however. In Alaska, California,
Texas, and Wisconsin, community property transferred into a trust remains
community property either automatically or by the couple's provision of such
in the trust instrument.2 0 5 While no clear authority exists for the other commu-
nity property states, one commentator points out, "Because the character of
community property is generally not affected by how title is held .... it would
follow that titling property in the name of a revocable trust or trusts should not
affect the community property character of the property. °20 6 In any case, Rev-
enue Ruling 66-283 indicates that trust property will be considered community
property as long as it is found to be community property under state law. Thus,
201 Rev. Rul. 66-283, 1966-2 C.B. 297.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Alaska Community Property Act § 34.77.060(b); CAL. FAM. CODE § 761 (West 1994);
WIs. STAT. § 766.31(5) (2001); Jameson v. Bain, 693 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Tex. App. 1985).
206 Shelly D. Merritt, Planning for Community Property in Colorado, COLO. LAW., June
2002, at 79, 82.
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depending on state law, community property in a trust can take advantage of
§ 1014(b)(6).
H. Alaska Community Property Trusts
A final area for consideration is whether property transferred into an
Alaska community property trust by nonresidents will be considered commu-
nity property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). Though it might seem that such
trusts could not take advantage of § 1014(b)(6), there are some arguments in
favor of allowing the full step up.
As part of the Alaska Community Property Act, Alaska's legislature
passed a statute allowing for the creation of Alaska community property trusts,
which can be created by nonresidents.2" 7 The nonresident couple need only
comply with a few requirements, such as having an Alaskan trustee, and they
have then transmuted the trust funds to community property.20 8 It is unclear,
however, whether the IRS will apply § 1014(b)(6) to such property.
Community property created by Alaska community property trusts might
seem to be an abuse of the full step up, but many commentators are quite cer-
tain they will be effective for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). 20 9 The IRS has not
spoken on Alaska community property trusts, but a couple of arguments weigh
in favor of their validity for § 1014(b)(6) purposes.
First, under standard trusts law, the grantor of the trust can usually choose
the law that will govern the trust (here it would be Alaska law).210 Moreover,
as Shaftel & Greer point out, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws would
probably apply Alaska law to such trusts.2 ' Section 6 of the Restatement
gives seven factors to consider when deciding which law to apply and one of
the most important in the context of trusts is the expectation of the parties.212
In Alaska community property trusts, the expectation of the parties would, of
course, call for the application of Alaska law. As a result, nonresident grantors
of Alaska community property trusts might be able to validly choose Alaska
law to govern their trusts, meaning that the trust property would be community
property. Thus, such trust property would fall within the plain language of
§ 1014(b)(6), which requires that property be community property "under the
community property laws of any State ... "
The Tax Court holding in Richman v. Commissioner supports the gran-
tor's right to choose the governing law. In Richman, a Texas resident had an
interest in a Massachusetts trust that called for Massachusetts law to govern.213
Upon his death, his estate argued that Massachusetts law applied and that th6
207 Alaska Community Property Act § 34.77.060(b).
208 Id. §§ 34.77.060(b) & 34.77.100.
209 Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 631; Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 16-17.
210 Blattmachr, et al., supra note 68, at 636-37 nn.90-91 (citing 5A ScoTr, ON TRUSTS
§§ 598, 611 (W. Frachter 4th ed. 1989) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 276 (1971)); Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 16-17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, at §§ 6, 187, 258, 270).
211 Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 16-18.
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 210, at § 6(2) (1971) & cmt. g
on Subsection (2).
213 Richman v. Comm'r, No. 22935-91, 1994 WL 456332 at *1-2 (U.S.Tax Ct. Aug. 23,
1994).
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interest was JTWROS, meaning it would qualify for a marital deduction under
§ 2056 of the federal estate tax.214 The IRS argued that Texas law had to
apply, meaning the interest would be community property and would pass
through his will, making the trust property ineligible for the marital deduction
at that time.21 5 The court applied Texas choice of law rules, which called for a
"most-significant-relationship" test under the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws, unless the parties had made a valid choice of law in the trust instru-
ment.2 1 6 The court held that the parties had validly chosen Massachusetts law
in the trust instrument.2 1 7 The court went on to refute the Service's claim that
this choice should not be respected because, under the Restatement, Massachu-
setts had no "sufficient relationship" with the trust.2 1 8 To the contrary, the
court found that Massachusetts had a very significant relationship with the
trust, noting, among other things, that both trustees were in Massachusetts. 19
The court thus applied Massachusetts law and allowed the deduction.2
The facts in Richman are quite analogous to the situation of nonresidents
of Alaska attempting to choose Alaska law to govern their Alaska community
property trust. They would presumably choose Alaska law to govern the trust
and would, as required by statute, have a trustee who resided in Alaska.2 2'
Further, their expectations would clearly weigh in favor of applying Alaska
law. Thus, if the couple's domiciliary state had choice of law rules similar to
those of Texas, Richman would require that Alaska law apply. The trust prop-
erty would then be community property "under the community property laws of
any State .... 222 satisfying the plain meaning of § 1014(b)(6) and allowing
the full step up.
A final argument in favor of allowing nonresidents to use Alaska commu-
nity property trusts for § 1014(b)(6) purposes lies in the very intent of § 1014
(b)(6) itself. As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of § 1014(b)(6) was
"to equalize the incidence of taxation between community-property and com-
mon-law states, not to provide a special benefit to community-property taxpay-
ers."2 23 Since § 1014(b)(6) is no longer so needed as an equalizer, it primarily
serves as a tax loophole for residents of community property states, while com-
mon law state residents are excluded from the full step up benefits. Thus, it
makes sense to allow common law state residents who are willing to submit to
Alaska trust law to take advantage of § 1014(b)(6), lest there continue to be "a
special benefit [for] community-property taxpayers. '"224
Though Alaska community property trusts seem, on their face, to abuse
§ 1014(b)(6), there are arguments in favor of allowing them for purposes of the
full step up. But this area of the law is completely untested, and the IRS posi-
214 id. at *1.
215 Id.
216 Id. at *5.
217 Id. at *7,
218 Id. at *8.
219 Id.
220 Id. at *10.
221 Alaska Community Property Act §§ 34.77.060(b).
222 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (2001).
223 Willging v. United States, 474 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1973).
224 Id.
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tion is unknown. Thus, nonresidents should approach Alaska community prop-
erty trusts with caution.
CONCLUSION: TiH FUTURE OF § 1014(n)(6)
The IRS appears to be very forgiving in the application of § 1014(b)(6).
The Service seems to have no problem allowing the full step up in cases of
commingling, universal property agreements, application of the Uniform Act
and community property trusts in certain states. 225 And it will probably allow
application of § 1014(b)(6) upon moves to certain common law states.2 26 It is
unclear how the Service will treat CPWROS, elective community property in
Alaska, and Alaska community property trusts, 2 27 but future IRS action should
clarify how it views such property for purposes of § 1014(b)(6). Indeed, the
Service only tends to deny the full step up when property clearly fails to fit
within the plain meaning of § 1014(b)(6).
Yet this forgiving stance is surprising because § 1014(b)(6) has long out-
lived its purpose as a taxation equalizer between community property and com-
mon law states. Now, due in part to this forgiving stance, it is primarily a tax
loophole for community property state residents. So what future does this
widely used provision have in the landscape of the Internal Revenue Code?
It is very possible that § 1014(b)(6) will disappear entirely in the near
future, having outlived its original purpose. Under current law, all of § 1014 is
set to disappear in 2010,228 but will reappear thereafter.22 9 Additionally, the
Clinton Administration's Fiscal 2001 Budget Proposal recommended the per-
manent elimination of § 1014, explaining:
When enacted in 1948, the stepped-up basis for community property was premised
on the fact that the usual case was that practically all the wealth of the married couple
was the property of the husband. Societal changes and changes to the estate tax
treatment of jointly held property in 1981 have undermined the premises on which
section 1014(b)(6) was based. Consequently, surviving spouses in community prop-
erty states now enjoy an unwarranted tax advantage over those in common law
states 230
Though this proposal was never acted upon in a permanent manner, the death
of section 1014(b)(6) looms as long as it provides community property state
taxpayers with a major tax advantage over common law state taxpayers.
Although it may have outlived its original purpose, section 1014(b)(6) is
still one of the most widely used tax loopholes in the Internal Revenue Code.
And as long as it survives, the section will continue to present fascinating
issues as the IRS defines its boundaries.
225 See supra sections A, B, C, and G.
226 See supra section D.
227 See supra sections E, F, and H.
228 I.R.C. § 1014(f) (2005).
229 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 901, I.R.C. § 1 (2005).
230 Clinton Administration's Fiscal 2001 Budget Proposal, quoted in Jerome Ostrov, Estate
Tax Issues Associated with Jointly Held Real Estate, PLIREF-TAXREL § 13:4.5, 13-28
(2001) (internal citation omitted). Also cited as Dept. of Treas. Revenue Proposal of Feb.
1999, in Shaftel & Greer, supra note 47, at 23.
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